Abstract Recent projections of energy intensity predict a more rapid decline in intensity than has occurred in the recent past. To assess how well such projections have performed in the past, I assess the accuracy of the business as usual energy intensity projections embedded in the annual World Energy Outlook (WEO) produced by the International Energy Agency since 1994. Changes in energy intensity depend on economic growth, and historical errors in projecting energy intensity can partly be explained by errors in projecting the rate of economic growth. However, recent projections of the elasticity of energy intensity with respect to economic growth probably overstate the likely future reduction in energy intensity even if economic growth is projected accurately. This could be because energy efficiency policies are not implemented as effectively as expected or because the economy-wide rebound effect is larger than modeling assumes.
1 Introduction predict that energy intensity will decline more rapidly than in the past. The 2016 World Energy Outlook (WEO-2016) also projects more rapid decline in energy intensity in the future under the BCurrent Policies^scenario than has occurred in the last couple of decades (Fig. 1) . 1 Here, I investigate how well the WEO has projected changes in energy intensity to date and evaluate the prospects for achieving such a rapid decline in the future.
The mean rate of decline of world energy intensity from 1990 to 2015 was 1.46% p.a. (Fig. 1) . WEO-2016's Current Policies projection sees energy intensity declining by 2.09% p.a. till 2020 and by 2.13% p.a. between 2020 and 2030, after which the rate moderates to 1.7% p.a.
2 Energy intensity did decline more rapidly than this in a few recent years during the later years of economic booms. But these were exceptions. In the immediate aftermath of the Great Recession of [2008] [2009] , energy intensity actually increased, and its decline was quite slow in the early part of the previous boom too (Jotzo et al. 2012) . The New Policies scenario expects more rapid decline still in future energy intensity.
Though the projected rate of decline under BAU is more rapid than that in the recent past, this does not mean that such a rate of decline is impossible. Perhaps there are good reasons why the decline should accelerate. How well have past projections matched subsequent reality? The WEO provides a good case study, as the IEA has published the WEO annually since 1993 (with the exception of 1997) and most editions contain a Baseline, BAU, Reference, or Current Policies projection of world economic growth and energy use. I analyze projections of economic growth and energy use in all WEOs published since 1994, which are available online, to find out how well they have projected energy intensity to date. Of course, the IEA has always warned that real world developments may turn out differently to what they expected at the time of projection (IEA 1994 (IEA to 2016 . Still, it is important to know if there is a systematic bias in these projections rather than simply random forecast errors.
Projections vs. actual outcomes
Researchers have previously assessed how well the WEO has projected developments in solar PV and other renewable energy technologies (Metayer et al. 2015) and how well IPCC reports have projected carbon dioxide emissions intensity (Pretis and Roser 2016) .
3 Metayer et al. (2015) analyze projections in all WEOs from 1994 to 2014. They find that the growth of solar technologies and wind energy has been consistently strongly underestimated, suggesting that there could be systematic biases in the underlying modeling.
The IEA also assessed past WEO projections for OECD primary energy demand and world oil demand (IEA 2000) . They found that from WEO-1993 to WEO-1995 they underestimated OECD energy demand to 2000 while WEO-1996 and WEO-1998 overestimated it. The cumulative deviations by 2000 were, however, small-ranging from about −1.5 to +0.75%. Figure 2 shows, for each WEO, the difference between the actual annual rate of change of energy intensity and its projected rate of change in subsequent years. Positive deviations indicate that energy intensity declined by less (in absolute value) than it was projected to, so that the level of energy intensity was higher than projected in 2015 (2010 for WEO-1994 to WEO-1996 and vice versa. Intensity declined more slowly in following years than WEO-1994 to WEO-1996 projected. Then from WEO-1998 to WEO-2003 energy intensity declined much faster in subsequent years than projected. Finally, from WEO-2004, with the exception of WEO-2014, the projections have been over-optimistic about the rate of decline in energy intensity. Fig. 2 Energy intensity projection errors. The dates refer to the publication date of the WEO. The percentage error is the mean annual difference between the percentage rate of change in actual energy intensity and projected energy intensity from the base year of the respective WEO through 2015 for WEO-1998 forward. Positive values, therefore, indicate that energy intensity declined by less than expected and so the level of energy intensity was higher than projected in 2015 (2010 from WEO-1994 to WEO-1996 . Because the base year of WEO-2015 is 2013 and of WEO-2016 is 2014, it is possible to compute a projection error for these two latest reports It turns out that the correlation between these cumulative projection errors and the respective cumulative projection errors in GDP is −0.8. shows that the rate of change in energy intensity is negatively correlated with the rate of economic growth and that in the absence of economic growth energy intensity tends to increase slowly. As IEA uses external projections of GDP growth, a better assessment of the performance of the projections would remove the effect of economic growth.
Decomposing projections
We can use an identity decomposition to investigate the role of economic growth rate projections in projections of energy intensity. Denote the growth rate of energy intensity by g(E/Y), where E is global energy use, Y is total GDP, and g(.) is the average percentage growth rate over a given period. Then multiplying and dividing g(E/Y) by the growth rate of GDP, g(Y), we have:
The term g(E/Y)/g(Y) can be seen as the elasticity of energy intensity with respect to economic growth assuming that the rate of decline in energy intensity is zero in the absence of economic growth. 4 The major changes in the elasticity are associated with events in 2010 when energy intensity increased (Fig. 1) . The projections of WEO-1994 to WEO-1996 end in 2010. Hence their realized elasticities are relatively small. 2010 is included in the projection periods for WEO-1998 to WEO-2011 but the following years up to 2015 are also included in the calculations of the elasticity. From WEO-2012 on, 2010 is no longer included in the projection period, and, as a result, there is a sharp increase in the realized elasticity. This suggests that the range of values from WEO-1998 to WEO-2011 is likely to be more representative of the long-run value of the elasticity. Figure 3 shows that WEO-1994 to WEO-1996 overestimated the elasticity. From 1998 to 2001 the WEO estimated smaller elasticities, but these underestimated the actual elasticities. Since then, the projected elasticities have become larger. WEO-2009 to WEO-2011 overestimated the elasticity, whose realized value was influenced by the increase in energy intensity in 2010. From 2012, that increase in energy intensity was no longer in the projection period, the realized elasticity increased, and WEO-2012 to WEO-2015 underestimated the elasticity. Figure 4 decomposes the errors in projected energy intensity in Fig. 2 into the parts due to the error in projecting the elasticity and the error in the projected economic growth rate. I compute (1) for each projection period by substituting on the right hand side of (1) the projected elasticity for g(E/Y)/g(Y) but the actual realized growth rate of GDP for g(Y).
5 The error in projecting energy intensity using this substituted formula is then the part of the total error due to the elasticity, and the remaining error is due to the growth rate. Through 2001, the two components of the projection error are highly positively correlated (r = 0.995), while from 2002 to 2016 the correlation is −0.33. The correlation for the full period is 0.12. The mean absolute value of the two error components is similar, with the role of growth rate errors increasing relative to that of elasticity errors over time.
Explaining changes in the projection errors
Explaining changes in the behavior of the elasticity projection error over time has to be somewhat speculative, but we can point to some potential factors. The number of variables about which Fig. 3 Actual and projected elasticities of energy intensity with respect to economic growth. The dates refer to the publication date of the WEO. Both elasticities are computed from the base year of the WEO through 2015 for WEO-1998 forward. For WEO-1994 to WEO-1996 they are computed through 2010 Fig. 4 Decomposition of projection errors. The dates refer to the publication date of the WEO. Total error is equal to the projection error in Fig. 2 , which is the sum of the errors due to incorrect projection of the elasticity of energy intensity with respect to the rate of economic growth and incorrect projection of the rate of economic growth assumptions are made in IEA's modeling has changed over time, as has the number of explicit policies that the modelers have tried to take into account. In the earliest reports, the rate of economic growth, the future development of energy prices, the future development of energy efficiency in some sectors, future power generation capacity, and energy policies, in terms of taxes on energy, were all fed into the model that produced the energy use projection (IEA 1994 (IEA , 1995 (IEA , 1996 . WEO-1998 was based on a new world energy model (WEM, International Energy Agency 1998). In particular, additions to power generation capacity were modeled as an outcome of an economic optimization decision.
In WEO-2000 the BAU scenario was replaced with a Reference scenario that took into account specific new energy and climate change policies in OECD countries (IEA 2000) . However, these changes do not have an apparent effect on the elasticity itself in Fig. 3 or on the behavior of the elasticity projection error in Fig. 4 , which was highly correlated with errors in the rate of economic growth through WEO-2001 .
BThe WEM underwent a major overhaul in 2004^(IEA 2006 p. 55), which was further extended in the following years (IEA 2006 (IEA , 2007 . This allowed more detailed modeling of specific energy policies and measures (IEA 2006) . The 2004 revision coincides with larger positive elasticity projection errors in Fig. 4 and an increase in the absolute value of the elasticity in Fig. 3 . In WEO-2008, Bthe integration of the WEM into a general equilibrium model, started in 2007, was taken a step further, in order to model more precisely the feedback links between energy markets and the macro-economy^(IEA 2008 p. 61). These changes do coincide with a marked increase in the projected elasticity in Figure 3 . Subsequent reports (e.g., IEA 2011 IEA , 2013 IEA , 2014 increasingly emphasized that energy price projections were derived iteratively rather than being based completely on exogenous assumptions, but noted that the model was still a partial equilibrium model.
As the actual elasticities in recent years are based on very short time series that do not include a recession, they are likely to overestimate the true elasticity. Csereklyei and Stern (2015) find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the elasticity of energy use per capita with respect to GDP per capita increases with GDP per capita. Therefore, we should not necessarily expect the elasticity of interest here to decline over time. Instead, Csereklyei and Stern (2015) find that the slow growth of energy use in high income countries relative to upper middle income countries is mostly due to convergence effects-countries that were initially relatively energy intensive have converged in energy intensity with those that initially had relatively low energy intensity. It is likely, therefore, that since 2008, the WEO has overestimated the elasticities that will eventuate over the full projection horizons of 2030 to 2040.
The projected elasticities for recent years in Fig. 3 actually understate the elasticities that IEA expects to eventuate. IEA has stated that they expect countries to implement more policies than in the Current Policies scenario in subsequent years and that their central scenario is now the New Policies scenario (IEA 2015) . One possible reason for overestimating future elasticities is that not all stated policies are implemented as effectively as IEA expects, and over time there have been more and more explicit policies for IEA to incorporate in the WEM. The WEM now takes into account thousands of individual policies and measures (IEA 2011) .
Another possible reason why both IEA and the IPCC consensus projections overestimate the future decline in energy intensity is that they do not take the economy-wide rebound effect sufficiently into account (Saunders 2013) . Improvements in pure energy efficiency lower the cost of providing energy services and thus, via the law of demand, result in greater consumption of those energy services, so that the reduction in energy use is less than the improvement in energy efficiency. Economy-wide, this micro-level direct rebound effect may be amplified or attenuated by indirect rebound, general equilibrium, and dynamic effects (Stern 2011) . There are many empirical estimates of the micro-level direct rebound effect, but there are no good empirical estimates of the economy-wide rebound effect. Simulation models show that the economy-wide rebound could be larger or smaller than the micro-level rebound (Turner, 2013) . Depending on assumed model parameters, Turner (2009) finds that the economy-wide rebound effect for the UK could range from a negative value-where energy use falls by more than energy efficiency improves-to more than 100%-where energy use actually increases following an efficiency improvement.
However, the consensus is that the effect is positive and larger than the micro-level direct rebound effect (Saunders 2008; Stern 2011 ). Stern (2012 finds that reductions in energy intensity are considerably less than improvements in energy efficiency at the economy-wide level. The most important countervailing factor was substitution of energy for labor. Van Benthem (2015) and find that energy intensity is similar in today's developing countries to what it was in today's developed countries when they were at the same per capita income level, despite the huge improvements in energy efficiency in many technologies, which are used in both developed and developing countries alike. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, energy intensity is likely to decline by less than projected in the most recent WEO's despite their using more sophisticated and detailed modeling of the economy and energy policies. A possible reason for this is that they underestimate the size of the economywide rebound effect. This may also be the case for other projections of future energy intensity aggregated by the 2014 IPCC report. Empirical estimation of the economy-wide rebound effect and incorporation of the findings into energy projection models should be a research priority for energy economics and the climate policy community.
Data
I used the BAU, Reference, or Current Policies projection of world economic growth rates and the level of world energy use from each WEO for each sub-period and specific year that they were given, respectively. WEO-1999 did not report specific quantities of projected future energy use but did state that energy use was expected to rise by 65% by 2020 and that the same economic growth rate projections were used as in WEO-1998 . For WEO-1995 and WEO-1996 , I used the Bcapacity constraints^scenario, which assumes historical trends in energy efficiency. In the case of WEO-1996, where separate market (MER) and purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate economic growth rate projections were given, I use the PPP growth rate. WEO-1994 and WEO-1995 give only a MER world economic growth rate. This is 0.1% p.a. lower than the MER growth rate in WEO-1996 in 1995 and 0.3% p.a. lower in 1994 and so I assume that the respective PPP growth rates are also 0.1 and 0.3% p.a. lower. I used actual world GDP in 2011 PPP dollars from the World Bank's World Development Indicators for the base year of the projections in the report and projected GDP at future dates using the given growth rates. I then divided the projected energy use at each future date by projected GDP to give projected energy intensity. I then computed the growth rate of energy intensity in each future sub-period.
